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Can Brain Drain Justify Immigration
Restrictions?*
Kieran Oberman
This article considers one seemingly compelling justiﬁcation for immigration
restrictions: that they help restrict the brain drain of skilled workers from poor
states. For some poor states, brain drain is a severe problem, sapping their ability
to provide basic services. Yet this article ﬁnds that justifying immigration restric-
tions on brain drain grounds is far from straightforward. For restrictions to be
justiﬁed, a series of demanding conditions must be fulﬁlled. Brain drain does pro-
vide a successful argument for some immigration restrictions, but it is an argument
that fails to justify restrictions beyond a small minority of cases.
States routinely prevent peaceful people from living and working where
they want to by subjecting them to immigration restrictions. This fact is
well known and yet only relatively recently has it become the subject of
philosophical debate. Previously, philosophers seemed content to let the
popular assumption that it is up to states to decide who may enter their
territory go unquestioned. Now a number of philosophers have begun
to challenge this assumption. In their view immigration restrictions con-
stitute an unacceptable curtailment of individual liberty. They note that
people require freedom of movement in order to fulﬁll their basic life
projects, such as pursuing a career, maintaining social relationships, and
practicing their religion. Free movement within a state has long been
recognized as a human right. Since people wish to move internationally for
* Previous drafts of this article were presented at Cambridge, Keele, Stanford, and
Louvain la Neuve. I have greatly beneﬁted from the feedback I received. I owe particular
thanks to Daniel Butt, Simon Caney, Eamonn Callan, Joseph Carens, Joshua Cohen, Sarah
Fine, Matthew Gibney, Robert Jubb, Jenny MacDonald, David Miller, Rob Reich, Debra Satz,
Christine Straehle, and Leif Wenar. I would also like to thank the two anonymous reviewers
and the editors of Ethics for their excellent comments and helpful suggestions.
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the same reasons they wish to move domestically, there seems a strong case
for deeming the freedom to migrate to be of equal moral signiﬁcance.1
Not all are convinced by this new line of argument however. Some
philosophers have sought to defend the traditional idea that states are
freely entitled to exclude foreigners from their territory. Yet even these
philosophers agree that what was once simply assumed now requires de-
fense. Immigration restrictions unquestionably curtail individual liberty.
For this reason, if no other, they require justiﬁcation.2
One possible justiﬁcation for immigration restrictions is that they
help to prevent brain drain, the large-scale migration of skilled workers
from poor to rich states.3 Brain drain affects many countries throughout
the world. In Granada, Haiti, and Jamaica, the skilled emigration rate is
above 80 percent. In Africa, Cape Verde has a rate of 68 percent; Mauri-
tius, 56 percent; Sierra Leone 52 percent; and Ghana, 47 percent.4 Brain
drain need not always be deleterious. There are a number of compensa-
1. See JosephH. Carens, “Migration andMorality: A Liberal Egalitarian Perspective,” in
Free Movement: Ethical Issues in the Transnational Migration of People and of Money, ed. Brian
Barry and Robert E. Goodin ðUniversity Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1992Þ,
25–47; Phillip Cole, Philosophies of Exclusion ðEdinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2000Þ;
Ann Dummett, “The Transnational Migration of People Seen from within a Natural Law Tra-
dition,” in Free Movement: Ethical Issues in the Transnational Migration of People and of Money, ed.
BrianBarry andRobert E.Goodin ðUniversity Park: Pennsylvania StateUniversity Press, 1992Þ,
169–80; Darrel Moellendorf, Cosmopolitan Justice ðBoulder, CO: Westview, 2002Þ; Hillel Stei-
ner, “Hard Borders, Compensation, and Classical Liberalism,” in Boundaries, Autonomy and
Justice: Diverse Ethical Views, ed. David Miller and Sohail H. Hashimi ðPrinceton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 2001Þ, 79–88. Also see Sec. IV.
2. There are a multitude of justiﬁcations that have been offered for immigration re-
strictions, including arguments from national self-determination, state sovereignty, freedom
of association, cultural diversity, and social justice. For these alternative justiﬁcations for
immigration restrictions, see John Isbister, “A Liberal Argument for Border Controls: Reply
to Carens,” International Migration Review 34 ð2000Þ: 629–35; David Miller, National Respon-
sibility and Global Justice ðOxford: Oxford University Press, 2007Þ; John Rawls, The Law of
Peoples ðCambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999Þ; Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice: A
Defense of Pluralism and Equality ðNew York: Basic Books, 1983Þ; Christopher H. Wellman,
“Immigration and Freedom of Association,” Ethics 119 ð2008Þ: 109–41; and Frederick G.
Whelan, “Citizenship and Freedom of Movement: An Open Admission Policy?” in Open Bor-
ders? Closed Societies? ed. Mark Gibney ðNew York: Greenwood, 1988Þ, 3–39. Note that whether
or not one ﬁnds these other justiﬁcations compelling, the question of whether immigration
restrictions can be justiﬁed on brain drain grounds remains of interest, not least because it is
an argument that open border advocates, given their own commitments, should ﬁnd partic-
ularly troubling. This is a point I develop below.
3. Here I deﬁne ‘brain drain’ narrowly. The term can also be used more broadly to
mean the migration of skilled workers from any state to any other state, whether rich or
poor. My use of the narrower deﬁnition reﬂects the focus of this article.
4. Devesh Kapur and John McHale, “Should a Cosmopolitan Worry about the ‘Brain
Drain’?” Ethics and International Affairs 20 ð2006Þ: 305–20, esp. 306–7.
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tory factors, such as the remittances that migrants send home, which in
some cases prove sufﬁcient to turn brain drain into a net gain for poor
sending states. But there are also cases in which brain drain is profoundly
deleterious. Consider the case of the Zambian health care system. For a
population of almost 12 million people, Zambia has only 646 doctors and
6,096 nurses. Between 1998 and 2003, 461 Zambian nurses were recruited
to the United Kingdom. Around half of the 50–60 doctors who graduate
from the country’s only medical school each year emigrate soon after.5
Brain drain saps Zambia’s power to confront its horrendous levels of mal-
nutrition, disease, and ill health. Fully 1.1 million Zambians have AIDS/
HIV. Life expectancy is just 40 years.6 In cases of this sort, brain drain leaves
people who are already desperately poor worse off still.7
If rich states chose to enforce immigration restrictions against skilled
workers from states suffering deleterious brain drain, instead of continu-
ing to offer many of them residency visas, rich states would remove the
strongest incentive these skilled workers have to leave. Conversely, if rich
states lifted the restrictions that prevent more skilled workers coming, it
would almost certainly worsen the problem. Given the costs that brain
drain can involve, it seems to offer a strong argument for imposing im-
migration restrictions in these cases.8
Brain drain is not a justiﬁcation for immigration restrictions that
states themselves tend to offer. Indeed, skilled workers are among the
5. Joseph J. Schatz, “Zambia’s Health Worker Crisis,” Lancet 371 ð2008Þ: 638–39, 638.
6. Joint UN Program on HIV/AIDS, 2006 Report on the Global Aids Epidemic ðNew York:
United NationsÞ, 487.
7. This article will not intervene in the important empirical debate over the extent to
which brain drain is deleterious. Articles that highlight the possibility of beneﬁcial brain
drain includeMichael Beine, Frederic Docquier, andHillel Rapoport, “Brain Drain and Eco-
nomic Growth: Theory and Evidence,” Journal of Development Economics 64 ð2001Þ: 275–89;
and Oded Stark, “Rethinking the Brain Drain,” World Development 32 ð2004Þ: 15–22. Others
ﬁnd this revisionary literature unconvincing. See Riccardo Faini, “The Brain Drain: An Un-
mitigated Blessing?” ðDevelopment Studies Working Paper no. 173, Centro Studi Luca
d’Agliano, 2003Þ. This article stays clear of this empirical debate to focus instead on the
normative question of whether, in those cases in which brain drain is deleterious, it can justify
immigration restrictions. The only assumption the article therefore makes is that there are
at least some cases where brain drain does impose severe costs on sending states. The
medical brain drain from Zambia and other sub-Saharan African countries seems to be such
a case.
8. The idea of using immigration restrictions to address brain drain is implicit in pro-
posals made by Kapur and McHale in “Should a Cosmopolitan Worry about the ‘Brain
Drain’?” Their approach is considered below. The idea is entertained, if not endorsed, by
Gillian Brock, Global Justice: A Cosmopolitan Account ðOxford: Oxford University Press, 2009Þ,
198–212; and Lea Ypi, “Justice in Migration: A Closed Borders Utopia?” Journal of Political
Philosophy 16 ð2008Þ: 391–418. It is rejected by Carens, in “Migration and Morality,” 32–34;
and Fernando R. Tesón, “Brain Drain,” San Diego Law Review 45 ð2008Þ: 899–932.
Oberman Can Brain Drain Justify Immigration Restrictions? 429
This content downloaded from 129.215.19.193 on Tue, 21 Jan 2014 10:34:06 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
potential immigrants that states are most willing to admit. Within the con-
text of the philosophical debate over immigration restrictions, however, the
brain drain argument has almost unique force. For it draws our attention to
what everyone can agree is of signiﬁcant moral importance: the needs of
desperately poor people.Whatever weight onemay award to an individual’s
freedom to migrate abroad, it seems hard to deny that the needs of the
desperately poor take priority. To be prevented from entering a foreign
state is one thing; to die from an easily curable disease for lack of medical
attention is quite another. Critics of immigration restrictions, who tend to
position themselves as defenders of the poor, should thus ﬁnd the brain
drain argument particularly troubling. If anything can justify immigration
restrictions, it seems brain drain can.
Yet, this article ﬁnds that justifying immigration restrictions on brain
drain grounds is far from straightforward. While it concludes that this jus-
tiﬁcation can succeed, it also demonstrates that a series of demanding
conditions must ﬁrst be fulﬁlled. Together these conditions are likely to
greatly restrict the range of circumstances under which counter-brain-
drain immigration restrictions can justly be imposed. Brain drain does
function as the basis for a successful argument for some immigration re-
strictions, but it is an argument that is of little use to anyone who wishes
to defend restrictions outside a small minority of cases.
Section I presents the reasoning behind the four conditions for ex-
clusion to be justiﬁed on brain drain grounds. These are ð1Þ that a skilled
worker has a duty to assist her poor compatriots, ð2Þ that this duty entails a
duty to stay in her state of origin, ð3Þ that a skilled worker’s duty to stay
and assist her poor compatriots can justly be enforced using immigration
restrictions, and ð4Þ that a rich state has the legitimacy to impose counter-
brain-drain immigration restrictions. Section II argues that the ﬁrst con-
dition will often be met, since skilled workers will normally have two types
of duty to assist their poor compatriots: an “obligation of repayment” and a
“duty of assistance.” An obligation of repayment is an obligation to repay
the costs of training. A duty of assistance, by contrast, is simply a duty to
make poor people better off. Section III turns to the second condition,
arguing that skilled workers may have a duty to stay in their state of origin,
but only if they can better provide the assistance they owe their poor
compatriots by remaining in their home state and only if staying does not
involve unreasonably high costs. Section IV argues that a skilled worker’s
duty to stay and assist her poor compatriots can only be enforced using
immigration restrictions if rich states have no acceptable alternative means
of countering brain drain. Section V questions whether rich states that
have failed to fulﬁll their own duties of assistance to the global poor have
the legitimacy to exclude skilled workers on brain drain grounds. SectionVI
concludes by laying out the full list of conditions under which exclusion can
be justiﬁed on brain drain grounds.
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Having spelled out the issues that this article seeks to address, it is
worth noting one important question this article does not address, which
is whether brain drain can justify the imposition of emigration restrictions
by poor states against their own citizens. States are commonly thought to
enjoy less discretion over emigration than immigration.9 The right to emi-
grate is recognized as a human right in international law.10 States that have
violated the right to emigrate, such as the Soviet Union and the German
Democratic Republic, have been widely condemned for doing so.11 Still, as
we shall see, many human rights are nonabsolute, and this seems likely to
be true of the human right to emigrate. There are likely to be circum-
stances under which the human right to emigrate could permissibly be
restricted, and brain drain may well be one of those circumstances. My
hypothesis is that a poor state can justify imposing emigration restrictions
on brain drain grounds as long as it fulﬁlls a similar set of conditions as
those presented in this article. I cannot defend that hypothesis here,
however. This article attends to the question of what rich states should do
to address brain drain. As long as poor states are unable or unwilling to
prevent their skilled workers from leaving, rich states must decide how to
respond. For those who are citizens of rich states, the question of how rich
states should respond is of particular importance. We have the power to
inﬂuence policy in our own states that we do not have in relation to other
states. We need to decide whether to use our inﬂuence to promote or
oppose the exclusion of skilled workers.
I. THE FOUR CONDITIONS
In their article “Should a Cosmopolitan Worry about ‘Brain Drain’?”
Devesh Kapur and JohnMcHale set out three principles they claim should
guide policy responses to brain drain: “global liberty ðfreedom of move-
mentÞ; global efﬁciency ðmaximizing the size of the global ‘pie’ of re-
sourcesÞ; and global equity ðpromoting equality or granting priority to
improvements in the well-being of the less advantagedÞ.”12 They go on to
advocate policies that, they claim, “lead to a better balancing of the three
principles than the status quo.”13 The policies they suggest include a less
skills-focused immigration policy, temporary worker programs, and taxes
on emigrants.14
9. This is not a view I share. See n. 61 below.
10. See article 13 ð2Þ of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights ðUDHR; 1948Þ and
article 12 ð4Þ of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ðICCPR; 1966Þ.
11. For a history of the use of emigration restrictions, see Alan Dowty, Closed Borders: The
Contemporary Assault on Freedom of Movement ðNew Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1987Þ.
12. Kapur and McHale, “Should a Cosmopolitan Worry about ‘Brain Drain’?” 313.
13. Ibid., 317.
14. Ibid., 317–19.
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It is notable that two of these three policy proposals implicitly involve
immigration restrictions. A less skills-focused immigration policy involves
excluding more skilled workers. Temporary worker programs involve re-
strictions on how long a skilled worker can stay. Still, these policies allow
some kinds of immigration to continue ðunskilled and temporaryÞ, and to
that extent they leave room for “global liberty.”Kapur andMcHale cannot
then be faulted for failing to trade off their various principles. Nor should
they be faulted for exploring various policy solutions to the brain drain
problem—one of the aims of this article is to do just that.15 Kapur and
McHale can be faulted, however, for their underlying methodological
approach. The idea that an ethical response to the brain drain problem
involves simply trading off or “balancing” certain principles—whether it is
the three principles Kapur and McHale refer to or, more simply, those of
achieving free movement for skilled workers against securing assistance
for their poor compatriots—is deeply mistaken. A full account must con-
sider not only the results that different policies yield but also the means by
which those results are obtained.16
Immigration restrictions coercively prevent people from being within
a state’s territory. They may work by blocking entry ðborder guards, fences,
etc.Þ, forcing migrants to leave ðdeportation squadsÞ, or denying migrants
a means to subsist within the country ðbans on migrant employmentÞ. In
each case the aim is the same: to leave would-be migrants with no alter-
native, or at least no acceptable alternative, to life outside the border.17
Imposing immigration restrictions against skilled workers on brain
drain grounds involves not only coercing people in these ways, but also
for a certain purpose, which is to try to get them to stay and work in their
15. See Secs. III and IV.
16. When Carens describes the brain drain argument for immigration restrictions as
among “the sorts of arguments that have given utilitarianism a bad name,” I think he is
referring to an argument involving a simple trade-off of freedom of movement for poverty
reduction ðCarens, “Migration and Morality,” 33Þ. Carens goes on to reject counter-brain-
drain restrictions except in cases in which skilled workers have an obligation to repay the
costs of their training. Carens is right to reject an argument for restrictions based on a sim-
ple trade-off of freedom of movement for poverty reduction, but, as I shall show, a more
sophisticated argument for excluding skilled workers ðeven when they have no training costs
to repayÞ can be developed.
17. Immigration restrictions do not then include measures, such as an affordable em-
igrant tax, which simply make migration less rewarding. While I shall return to the emigrant
tax idea in Sec. III, the question of when precisely such disincentives can and cannot be
justiﬁed falls beyond the scope of this article. Also beyond the scope of this article is the
question of whether and when rich states may actively recruit skilled workers overseas. The
issue of active recruitment has generated concern among civil society organizations, which
have, in turn, placed pressure on governments to sign voluntary codes of conduct, such as the
World Health Organization, Global Code of Practice on the International Recruitment of Health
Personnel ðGeneva: World Health Organization, 2010Þ.
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home state and, thereby, assist their poor compatriots. To justify coercion
of this sort, and for this purpose, one must do more than show that better
results accrue; one must show that the skilled workers in question have a
duty to do what they are being coerced to do.
The general rule here is that coercion should only be used against
a person when that person is subject to a moral duty. This rule reﬂects
the thought that coercion infringes on people’s status as autonomous
agents—people who can decide for themselves how to live their lives—
and as such it requires justiﬁcation. The justiﬁcation that is called for is
one that establishes an appropriate kind of connection between the co-
erced persons and the goal that is being pursued. Evidence that a person
has a duty to do what they are being coerced to do establishes this con-
nection.18
When the purpose of coercion is to get people to labor for the beneﬁt
of others, the no-coercion-without-a-moral-duty rule assumes particular
importance. To coerce people to get them to labor for others, without
ﬁrst establishing that they have a duty to labor, is to come too close to
treating themmerely as ameans to be acceptable.19 Skilled workers are not
tools; they are human beings who have their own goals and their own lives
to lead. Unless they have a duty to stay and assist their poor compatriots,
they should not be prevented from migrating. So while the general rule,
no doubt, admits of exceptions, the present case is not one of them.
Demonstrating that skilled workers have a duty to stay and assist their
poor compatriots itself involves two conditions: it must ﬁrst be shown that
skilled workers have a duty to assist their poor compatriots, and then it
must be shown that this duty to assist entails a duty to stay.20 For the ﬁrst
duty does not necessarily entail the second. Moreover, even if these ﬁrst
two conditions are fulﬁlled, it must further be shown that it is morally
acceptable to enforce a skilled worker’s duty to stay and assist her poor
18. There is an interesting analogy to be drawn between coercing people who have no
duty to comply and two other ðnormallyÞ wrongful activities: punishing the innocent and
targeting noncombatants in war. In all three cases the victims, lacking a certain character-
istic, do not seem liable to the treatment they receive. There is, no doubt, much more to be
said here in support of the no-coercion-without-a-moral-duty rule, but pursuing this issue
further here would take us too far off topic.
19. Contrast this with Robert Nozick’s suggestion that to coerce people to labor for the
beneﬁt of others necessarily involves treating those people merely as a means ðAnarchy, State
and Utopia ½New York: Basic Books, 1974, 30–33Þ.
20. Someone may suggest that as long as states pass laws to enforce counter-brain-drain
immigration restrictions, skilled workers have a duty to comply. They have a duty to comply
simply because they have a duty to obey the law. On this view, no duty, independent of law,
need be identiﬁed. The problem with this objection is that it is unclear why foreigners
should be thought to have a duty to obey immigration law unless they have an independent
duty to do so. Traditional arguments for the duty to obey the law ðconsent, fair play, de-
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compatriots using immigration restrictions. It is not true that all moral
duties can permissibly be enforced; many cannot. Finally, it must be
demonstrated that the rich state that intends to enforce a skilled worker’s
duty to stay in her home state by imposing counter-brain-drain immi-
gration restrictions has the legitimacy to do so.21 For even if a duty can be
enforced, it is not the case that anyone can enforce it.22
We have then four conditions for the imposition of immigration
restrictions to be justiﬁed on brain drain grounds. Since these four con-
ditions will form the skeleton upon which the rest of the article hangs, let
me formally set them out here.
A rich state can justify imposing immigration restrictions against a
skilled worker on brain drain grounds only if:
1. The skilled worker owes assistance to her poor compatriots.
2. The skilled worker has a duty to stay in her state of origin to pro-
vide the assistance she owes her poor compatriots.
3. It is permissible to enforce a skilled worker’s duty to stay and as-
sist her poor compatriots using immigration restrictions.
4. The rich state has the legitimacy to impose counter-brain-drain
immigration restrictions.
Having set out these four conditions, the rest of the article will be
dedicated to the task of investigating what would make these conditions
true. In other words, our aim is to discover the subconditions that attach
to these four main conditions. The ﬁnal result will be a full list of the
conditions that must be satisﬁed if immigration restrictions are to be
justiﬁed on brain drain grounds.
II. A DUTY TO ASSIST
It seems plausible that most skilled workers will owe some measure of
assistance to their poor compatriots. In fact, there are two different sorts
21. Sometimes “A has the legitimacy to do X” is used to mean nothing more than “A is
justiﬁed in doing X.” This is not what “legitimacy” means here. Here, the concept is invoked
to ensure that, in answering a question about justiﬁcation, we do not focus solely on the act
but also upon the agent that would perform the act. Here, the question “Does A have the
legitimacy to do X?”means something like “Given relevant facts about A, does A qualify as an
agent with the standing to do X?”
22. I present the arguments for each of these last two conditions in Secs. IV and V.
mocracy, etc.Þ run into signiﬁcant problems even in the case of citizens, the case for which
they are tailored. These arguments are even more unlikely to succeed in binding foreigners,
since foreigners ordinarily lack the sorts of ties ðmembership, receipt of beneﬁts, enfran-
chisementÞ upon which these arguments rely.
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of moral requirements they may owe: an “obligation of repayment” and a
“duty of assistance.”
An obligation of repayment is owed by skilled workers who have
acquired skills, during their adult life, at the poor state’s expense.23 It
obliges them to repay the costs of their training either with money or with
their labor. This obligation may have been formalized within a contract
that a skilled worker signed before starting her training. But even if no
such contract was signed, I think a skilled worker would be under an
obligation of repayment, assuming that ðiÞ she consented to receive the
training, ðiiÞ she knew the training was provided to her in the expecta-
tion that she would go on to beneﬁt her poor compatriots, and ðiiiÞ her
state can ill afford to provide such training for free. If one consumes the
resources of the poor in the knowledge that they expect reciprocation,
one has a duty to reciprocate in the manner they desire or at least repay
them the costs of the resources consumed.
An obligation of repayment is essentially an obligation skilled work-
ers have not to make their compatriots worse off than they would have
been had the skilled workers never been trained. The training of skilled
workers should not be a net loss for their compatriots. Not all skilled
workers will owe an obligation of repayment. Many will have fulﬁlled their
obligation after years of productive work. Others will have paid for their
own training and thus have no debts to repay.
A duty of assistance, by contrast, is simply a duty that skilled workers
have to make their poor compatriots better off. It arises independently of
any prior action or commitment the skilled workers made. Even if some
have fulﬁlled their obligation of repayment by paying off the costs of
their training or have avoided incurring this obligation in the ﬁrst place
by funding their own training, this duty of assistance would still require
them to assist their poor compatriots. In this way, the duty of assistance
binds even those who have no obligation of repayment.
How much must skilled workers do to fulﬁll their duty of assistance
to their poor compatriots? One answer to this question is that they must
do their “fair share,” that is, their share of the overall assistance burden
once it has been fairly divided among all those that are obligated to as-
sist.24 This answer raises two further questions: ðiÞ What is the overall as-
sistance burden? ðiiÞ What is a skilled worker’s fair share of this burden?
23. As the qualiﬁcation suggests, I do not think skilled workers have an obligation to
repay the costs of the basic education they received during childhood. Here I follow Carens,
who argues: “Everyone is entitled to basic education, and children cannot enter into binding
contracts. Whatever investments a society makes in its young, it cannot rightly require direct
payment” ðCarens, “Migration and Morality,” 33Þ.
24. This is the approach taken by Liam B. Murphy in Moral Demands in Nonideal Theory
ðOxford: Oxford University Press, 2000Þ.
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The overall assistance burden is the amount of money and other
resources required to bring the skilled worker’s poor compatriots up to
the level of welfare they are entitled to enjoy. Different theories of global
justice offer different accounts of what level of welfare the global poor
are entitled to enjoy, but one plausible view is that all humans have a right
to enough food, shelter, health care, and other basic necessities they
require to lead a minimally decent life.25
How large a skilled worker’s fair share of the overall assistance bur-
den is will depend on whether she has a “special duty” to assist her poor
compatriots, as a compatriot, beyond her “general duty” to do so.26 A gen-
eral duty of assistance is a duty to help someone in need that falls on any-
one with the money or skills to help, foreigner and compatriot alike. I
assume that people are bound by general duties to help the global poor.
Were skilled workers only subject to this general duty, they would not be
required to make any greater sacriﬁce for their compatriots than anyone
else who is equally able to assist, whether that be foreign skilled workers or
foreigners with money to spend. Indeed, since many people in rich states
are better off thanmost skilled workers in poor states, the lattermay actually
be required to contribute less than the former, at least as far as monetary
contribution is concerned.27
In addition to a general duty to provide assistance to their poor
compatriots, skilled workers may also have a “special duty” to do so, based
on ties of citizenship or nationality. If skilled workers do owe special du-
ties to their poor compatriots, then we can demand a greater level of
sacriﬁce from them than from foreigners. But the idea of special duties to
compatriots is controversial. Those who defend it claim that our rela-
tionship to our compatriots is one that we have reason to value. They
regard compatriots as people who form a community, not just people who
happen to live in the same territory.28 The analogy sometimes drawn is
with special duties to friends and family. Typically the relationships we
have with our friends and family are relationships we have reason to value,
and this seems to explain why we also have reason to show them special
25. Miller, National Responsibility and Global Justice, 163–200; Rawls, The Law of Peoples,
105–200.
26. For the distinction between general and special duties, see Robert E. Goodin,
“What Is So Special about Our Fellow Countrymen?” Ethics 98 ð1988Þ: 663–86.
27. I am assuming that the general duty to provide assistance to the global poor de-
mands that each make an equal level of sacriﬁce, rather than contribution. Since some are
better off than others, an equal level of sacriﬁce will demand an unequal level of contri-
bution.
28. Andrew Mason, “Special Obligations to Compatriots,” Ethics 107 ð1997Þ: 427–47;
David Miller, “Reasonable Partiality towards Compatriots,” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice
8 ð2005Þ: 63–81.
436 Ethics April 2013
This content downloaded from 129.215.19.193 on Tue, 21 Jan 2014 10:34:06 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
concern.29 Opponents of the idea of special duties to compatriots question
whether it is compatible with the idea of human equality.30 If all humans
are equal, why should we show greater concern for our compatriots than
for foreigners? These opponents may accept that we have special duties
to friends and family, but they would dispute an analogy between these
intimate relationships and the relationship that ties compatriots.31
Now, it might be thought that the debate regarding special duties is
crucial to the question of whether immigration restrictions can be justi-
ﬁed on brain drain grounds. For it might be supposed that only special
duties are strong enough to ground a duty upon skilled workers to stay in
their home state.32 While the question of whether skilled workers have a
duty to stay forms the subject of the next section, I wish to deal with this
precise issue here in order to show why, on the contrary, general duties to
assist have the potential to ground a duty to stay.
The reason why some might think general duties are too weak to
ground a duty to stay is because general duties do not require native
skilled workers to make any greater sacriﬁce for their poor compatriots
than skilled workers from other countries who are equally able to assist,
and yet it is rarely argued that skilled workers from other countries have
a duty to move to poor countries to assist people there. Why should it be
left to native skilled workers to reside in their country if they owe no more
to their poor compatriots than anyone else?
It is certainly true that the idea of special duties to compatriots and
the brain drain argument for immigration restrictions form natural com-
panions. Demands that skilled workers make signiﬁcant sacriﬁces for
their poor compatriots ﬁnd easy expression in the language of patriotism.
However, it is not true that general duties are incapable of grounding a
duty to stay. There are three important points to be made here. First, I am
assuming that general duties require equal levels of sacriﬁce from people
who are equally able to assist. But people who are better able to assist may
be required to make further sacriﬁces. Many skilled workers from poor
states are likely to have relevant skills and experience that make them
better able to assist their poor compatriots than foreign skilled workers.
29. Samuel Schefﬂer, Boundaries and Allegiances: Problems of Justice and Responsibility in
Liberal Thought ðOxford: Oxford University Press, 2001Þ, 97–110.
30. Paul Gomberg, “Patriotism Is Like Racism,” Ethics 101 ð1990Þ: 144–50.
31. Harry Brighouse and Adam Swift, “Legitimate Partiality, Parents and Patriots,” in
Arguing about Justice: Essays for Philippe Van Parijs, ed. Axel Gosseries and Yannick Vanderborght
ðLouvain: Presses Universitaires de Louvain, 2011Þ, 115–23, esp. 118–19; Christopher Heath
Wellman, “Friends, Compatriots, and Special Political Obligations,” Political Theory 29 ð2001Þ:
217–36, esp. 221–24.
32. Anne Raustøl, “Should I Stay or Go? Brain Drain and Moral Duties,” in The Inter-
nationalMigration of Health Workers: Ethics, Rights and Justice, ed. Rebecca S. Shah ðBasingstoke:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2010Þ, 175–88, esp. 178–79.
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For this reason, a native skilled workermay have a duty to reside in her own
country that a foreign skilled worker does not share. Second, it is likely to
be less costly for a native skilled worker to stay in her home country than it
is for a foreigner skilled worker to move there. People tend to have strong
social attachments binding them to their home state. If a foreigner moves
to a poor country, she must abandon these attachments, but this is not
true of the native who stays. This second point, like the ﬁrst, shows that
general duties alone can provide some support for the common view
that a duty to reside in a poor country falls on those who live there.
Third, however, the common view that only natives can be obligated
to reside in a poor country is open to question. Global poverty is a grave
evil which demands a determined response. The idea that some people,
particularly comparatively privileged people from rich states, have a duty
to go and do essential work in poor states, at least for a time, does not
seem so strange. There are in fact thousands who make such journeys
each year with organizations such as Voluntary Service Overseas, and
many of these volunteers no doubt feel driven by a sense of duty. Inter-
estingly, if even some foreign skilled workers have a duty to move to poor
states, then we seem required to reconceptualize the problem. We must
think not just about getting “them’” to stay but also about getting “us” to
go. Indeed, the problem would cease to be best described as one of
‘brain drain’ but rather one of ‘brain shortage’, signifying a lack of skilled
labor, whether native or foreign.
I shall not pursue these matters further. The important point to note
here is simply that, contrary to initial impressions, general duties to as-
sist can ground duties to stay, and thus one need not believe that people
owe special duties to their compatriots to make a brain drain argument
for immigration restrictions. Since this is so, and since the question of
whether special duties exist is a controversial one, I shall leave the issue
aside. I shall assume only that everyone who is able to assist the global poor
has a duty to do something and leave it open as to whether their compa-
triots must make any greater sacriﬁce than foreigners.
I have explored, if brieﬂy, the question of what a skilled worker’s fair
share of the overall assistance burden may be. We should note, however,
that whatever the correct answer is to that question, there is a further
question that needs to be asked, namely, does this fair share represent the
extent of the skilled worker’s duty of assistance? What if other people fail
to do their fair share? This is hardly a hypothetical possibility. Whatever
the truth regarding the extent of people’s duties to the global poor, I
think it is safe to say that most people are currently not doing enough.
Suppose a skilled worker has done her fair share but others have not: can
the skilled worker allow her poor compatriots to suffer as a result, or must
she take up the slack? Again we are in controversial territory, but I will work
with the assumption that skilled workers can have what may be called a
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“secondary duty” of assistance, to ﬁll in for noncompliant others, even after
they have fulﬁlled their “primary duty,” that is, their fair share.33
Whatever one’s position regarding general/special duties and pri-
mary/secondary duties, one need not think the duty of assistance is lim-
itless. The idea that people have an “agent-centered prerogative” allowing
them to do less than is required to produce what might otherwise be
thought the best result is one that receives wide support.34 I shall assume
that, under certain circumstances, skilled workers will be able to assert
an agent-centered prerogative in the face of demands that they provide
further assistance to their poor compatriots. Some proposed duties can
be rejected as simply too demanding.
To conclude this section, let us formally set out the ﬁrst two sub-
conditions for justifying the use of immigration restrictions on brain
drain grounds. Immigration restrictions can only be justiﬁed if a skilled
worker owes assistance to her poor compatriots. She owes assistance if:
1.i. She relied on state funds to pay for her training and has not
fulﬁlled her obligation of repayment and/or
1.ii. She has not fulﬁlled her duty of assistance.
III. THE DUTY TO STAY
Do a skilled worker’s duties and obligations to assist her poor compatriots
entail a further duty to stay in her state of origin? A skilled worker would
only have a duty to stay if two subconditions are satisﬁed. The ﬁrst is
2.i. The skilled worker cannot provide the assistance she owes from
abroad.
A skilled worker might be able to provide the assistance she owes
from abroad were the right institutions in place. To allow a skilled worker
to fulﬁll an obligation of repayment, a system of forgivable loans could be
instituted under which workers are given the choice to either labor in
their home state or repay their debts in cash payments from abroad. To
allow skilled workers to fulﬁll their duties of assistance, poor states could
33. Support for the idea of secondary duties of assistance can be found in Goodin,
“What Is So Special?” 686 n. 61; and Peter Unger, Living High and Letting Die: Our Illusion of
Innocence ðOxford: Oxford University Press, 1996Þ, 39–40. Liam Murphy argues against it in
Murphy, Moral Demands.
34. See G. A. Cohen, Rescuing Justice and Equality ðCambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 2008Þ, 61–62; Thomas Nagel, Equality and Partiality ðNew York: Oxford University
Press, 1991Þ, 169–80; Samuel Schefﬂer, The Rejection of Consequentialism: A Philosophical In-
vestigation of the Considerations Underlying Rival Moral Conceptions ðOxford: Clarendon, 1982Þ.
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learn from the American example and tax their emigrants.35 If poor states
have problems collecting an emigrant tax, as many will, then there is the
possibility that rich states that host their emigrants could collect it for
them. The revenue from such taxation could potentially be so large that
the skilled workers beneﬁt their poor compatriots more from abroad
than they would do by staying home. The revenues raised could be used
for a variety of purposes, but one obvious use would be to meet the costs
of replacement workers.36
One thing that is to be said in favor of these proposals is that they
seek to address the brain drain problem by alternative means to immi-
gration restrictions, yet they do not remove from skilled workers the bur-
den of fulﬁlling their duties to their poor compatriots. In this way, these
proposals differ from those that place additional burdens elsewhere:
proposals that I shall return to in the next section. Nevertheless, it is by
no means certain that skilled workers will be able to provide the nec-
essary assistance from abroad. Take the emigrant tax proposal: it may fail
for two reasons. First, a skilled worker, such as a doctor or a teacher, who
provides an essential service, can only compensate for her absence by
paying an emigrant tax if there are other workers back home to replace
her. The tax revenues from emigrants could go to make salaries at home
more attractive, but in some states conditions will be so bad that higher
salaries will not be enough to prevent skilled workers from leaving.
Second, there may be problems in collecting or spending the emigrant
tax revenue. For instance, a poor state may ﬁnd it impossible to collect
this revenue, and rich states may refuse to collect it for them, or a poor
state may suffer from an incompetent or corrupt government that can-
not be trusted to distribute the revenues effectively.
We have reason to think, then, that some skilled workers will ﬁnd it
impossible to provide the requisite assistance from abroad. But even so
this does not necessarily mean they have a duty to stay. To demand that
someone stay when she wants to move is to demand that she accepts a
signiﬁcant additional burden. In some circumstances this burden will be
so great so as to make it impossible to say skilled workers have a duty to
35. For analysis of the American example, see Mihir A. Desai, Devesh Kapur, and John
McHale, “Sharing the Spoils: Taxing International Human Capital Flows,” International Tax
and Public Finance 11 ð2004Þ: 663–93, esp. 678–82.
36. For discussion of emigrant taxes, see Jagdish N. Bhagwati and Martin Partington,
Taxing the Brain Drain: A Proposal ðAmsterdam: North Holland, 1976Þ; and Desai, Kapur, and
McHale, “Sharing the Spoils,” 190–95. An emigrant tax might need to be accompanied by a
tax on expatriation to prevent skilled workers from simply changing their citizenship to
avoid taxation. Would an expatriation tax be morally wrong? Only if one thought that the
duties skilled workers owe their poor compatriots are based ða Þ only on special duties that
ðb Þ expire at the moment a skilled worker chooses to switch their citizenship. Cosmopoli-
tans ðamong othersÞ are likely to reject ða Þ, nationalists to reject ðb Þ.
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stay even if it is the only way they can provide the assistance they owe and
even if leaving will necessarily make their poor compatriots worse off. As
noted above, everyone has an agent-centered prerogative allowing them
to resist duties that are too burdensome. Thus, we may say that a skilled
worker only has a duty to stay if
2.ii. She will not face an unreasonably high cost in staying.
But when are the costs of staying unreasonably high? Let me suggest
four plausible examples of skilled workers threatened by unreasonably
high costs: ð1Þ those separated from their immediate family, ð2Þ those
living in fear of persecution, civil conﬂict, or widespread violence,
ð3Þ those living in severe poverty, and ð4Þ those working in dangerous con-
ditions. In each of these cases, skilled workers risk losing goods of funda-
mental value. In the ﬁrst case, it is the relationships that, for most of us, are
our primary source of love and happiness. In the second, third, and fourth
cases, it is security, health, and subsistence. It is unreasonable to expect
anyone to sacriﬁce these goods in order to do work that beneﬁts her com-
patriots.
Unfortunately, many skilled workers fall into one or more of these
groups. One study lists “poor remuneration, bad working conditions, an
oppressive political climate, persecution of intellectuals, and discrimina-
tion” as primary causes of medical brain drain.37 In some countries, wages
for skilled work are insufﬁcient to cover basic needs. The monthly wage of
a nurse in Zambia is a mere $299; this is less than the $350 a family needs
for food.38 In a study of Zimbabwean health professionals, 68.5 percent
said they found it difﬁcult to live on their earnings.39 Across the develop-
ing world, health professionals are routinely forced to take on additional
work just to get by.40 The work that skilled workers are required to per-
form, moreover, is often stressful, unregulated, and unsafe. A combina-
tion of low staff to patient ratios, high rates of disease, and inadequate
equipment place health professionals under signiﬁcant mental and physi-
37. Tikki Pang, Mary Ann Lansang, and Andy Haines, “Brain Drain and Health Pro-
fessionals,” British Medical Journal 324 ð2002Þ: 499–500, 499.
38. David Lusalle, “WhyDo ZambianHealthWorkersMigrate Abroad? The BrainDrain
of Zambian Health Workers,” Bulletin of Medicus Mundi Switzerland 104 ð2007Þ: 19–21, 20.
39. Abel Chikanda, “Skilled Health Professionals’ Migration and Its Impact on Health
Delivery in Zimbabwe,” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 32 ð2006Þ: 667–80, 674. Note
that these examples of skilled workers living in severe hardship come from exactly the same
sector and region that seems to offer the clearest example of deleterious brain drain:
medical brain drain from sub-Saharan Africa.
40. John Connell, Migration and Globalisation of Health Care: The Health Worker Exodus?
ðCheltenham: Elgar, 2010Þ, 100.
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cal strain.41 In sub-Saharan Africa, the stress of work is compounded by the
fear of contracting HIV-AIDS from patients. There is a shortage of clinical
gloves and high incidents of needle-stick accidents during vaccinations.42 In
many countries safety regulations are either ill-enforced or nonexistent.43
War and civil conﬂict have also been important factors in prompting skilled
workers to leave. Iraq lost up to 8,000 of its 17,000 doctors after the 2003
invasion.44 Liberia had 400 doctors prior to war in 1989, but only twenty by
the time the war ended in 2003.45
These statistics suggest that many skilled workers have strong rea-
sons to leave, such strong reasons, in fact, that it would be unreasonable
to expect them to stay. This second subcondition thus signiﬁcantly re-
stricts the scope of justiﬁed counter-brain-drain immigration restrictions.
If a skilled worker does not have a duty to stay, she should not be pre-
vented from leaving.
However, skilled workers who enjoy an adequate degree of safety
and prosperity inside their country of origin and who could not provide
the assistance they owe from elsewhere will have a duty to stay. The next
question to be asked, then, is whether any such duty could justly be en-
forced using immigration restrictions.
IV. ENFORCEMENT
For immigration restrictions to be permissibly used for the sake of en-
forcing a skilled worker’s duty to stay, it must be the case that
3.i. There is no acceptable alternative means of ensuring that the
poor compatriots receive the assistance they are owed.
One acceptable alternative has already been mentioned: rich states
could collect emigrant taxes on the skilled workers they host. Even when
that policy is not available, however, another might be: rich states might
be able to provide the required assistance to compensate for the effects of
deleterious brain drain out of their own revenue. Rich states could use
their revenue to fund a salary increase for skilled workers in poor states to
41. Ibid., 107–9.
42. Debbie Palmer, “Tackling Malawi’s Human Resources Crisis,” Reproductive Health
Matters 14 ð2006Þ: 27–39, 31.
43. International Council of Nurses, Position Statement: Occupational Health and Safety for
Nurses ðGeneva: ICN, 2006Þ, 3.
44. Gilbert M. Burnham, Riyadh Lafta, and Shannon Doocy, “Doctors Leaving 12 Ter-
tiary Hospitals in Iraq, 2004–2007,” Social Science and Medicine 69 ð2009Þ: 172–77, 172.
45. Ministry of Planning and Economic Affairs, National Human Development Report,
2006 ðMonrovia: Government of Liberia, 2006Þ, 45.
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encourage them to stay voluntarily or to pay for the training of replace-
ment workers.
Now, since rich states owe general duties of assistance to the global
poor, it might be that any assistance required to counter brain drain
merely forms part of what rich states already owe. But suppose a rich
state has already fulﬁlled its initial duty of assistance. Would it have to
seek to provide extra assistance to counter brain drain before it could
impose immigration restrictions against skilled workers? The claim that it
would amounts to a demand that rich states take on extra burdens to
make up for a failure by skilled workers to fulﬁll their duties to their poor
compatriots. This may seem unfair. Why should a rich state have to take
up slack left behind by skilled workers if it could instead use immigration
restrictions to enforce the duties skilled workers owe?
I accept that it is unfair if rich states have to provide extra assis-
tance to make up for a failure by skilled workers to fulﬁll their duties to
their poor compatriots. Nevertheless rich states must seek to provide this
extra assistance before they can justify imposing counter-brain-drain im-
migration restrictions. I add this condition because I am convinced by the
argument that the freedom to cross borders is a basic liberty much like
domestic freedom of movement, association, or religion. Since the free-
dom to cross borders is a basic liberty, the freedom should only be re-
stricted for the sake of ensuring that desperately poor people receive
the assistance they are owed, not for the sake of avoiding unfairness to
rich states.46
This argument requires some unpacking, so let me explain, ﬁrst,
why the freedom to cross borders should be considered a basic liberty
and then, second, why this point implies that rich states cannot impose
immigration restrictions unless they ﬁrst seek to provide extra assistance
themselves. The idea that the freedom to cross borders is a basic liberty
follows from a proper understanding of the basic liberties that are al-
ready well recognized: freedom of movement, association, expression,
religion, and occupational choice.47 These freedoms are listed as human
rights in a number of international human rights documents, including
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights ðUDHRÞ and the Interna-
46. For related arguments, see Phillip Cole, “Towards a Symmetrical World: Migration
and International Law,” Ethics and Economics 4 ð2006Þ: 1–7; and Judith Bueno de Mesquita
and Matt Gordon, The International Migration of Health Workers: A Human Rights Analysis ðLon-
don: Medact, 2005Þ.
47. The argument I make here will be necessarily brief. I have, however, made the ar-
gument at length elsewhere. See Kieran Oberman, “Immigration as a Human Right” ðun-
published manuscript,” 2012; available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract52164939Þ, and
“Immigration and Freedom of Movement” ðDPhil diss., University of Oxford, 2009Þ. For re-
lated literature, see n. 1.
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tional Covenant onCivil and Political Rights ðICCPRÞ.48Within the borders
of states, people are entitled to choose where they go, who they see, what
they read, which ðif anyÞ religion they practice, and what work they do.
There are two important points to be made concerning these ðal-
ready recognizedÞ basic liberties. First, their scope is extensive. People are
entitled to more than just a degree of choice; they are entitled to some-
thing like the most extensive range of choice that is compatible with the
rights and liberties of others. To see this, note that governments can
violate basic liberties by banning just one option within a wide range. A
ban on Judaism ðsayÞ would violate freedom of religion even if all other
religions were to go unrepressed. Likewise, a ban on an individual asso-
ciation ðthe Sierra Club, the Philosophical Society, etc.Þ would violate
freedom of association, and a ban on an individual work of literature
ðUlysses, The Satanic Verses, etc.Þ freedom of expression, even if all other
associations and works of literature remained available.49
Further evidence of the extensive nature of basic liberties lies in the
fact that they are thought to entitle people to access options available in
foreign states once those states have permitted the person’s entry. The
human right to freedom of movement, for instance, is one that “everyone
lawfully within a State enjoys,” whether citizen or foreigner.50 If a UK
citizen passes US immigration in San Francisco, then the human right to
freedom of movement, conventionally deﬁned, entitles her to travel to
Los Angeles or Seattle or anywhere else in the United States that she
wishes to go. The same is true of the other basic liberties. While she is
lawfully within US territory, she is entitled to associate, worship, and ex-
press herself as she pleases. The United States must guarantee these basic
liberties “to aliens and citizens, alike.”51
Second, however, basic liberties are neither unbounded nor abso-
lute. Each person’s basic liberties are bounded by the rights and liberties
of others. One person’s basic liberty to free association is bounded by
the rights of others to refuse association. No one can force others to asso-
48. See articles 13 ð1Þ, 18, 19, 20, and 23 ð1Þ of the UDHR and articles 12 ð1Þ, 22 ð1Þ, 18,
and 19 ð2Þ of the ICCPR.
49. Compare this to Miller’s claim that basic liberties entitle people to no more than an
“adequate” range of options: “a reasonable choice of occupation, religion, cultural activities,
marriage partners and so forth” ðMiller, National Responsibility, 207Þ. The above-mentioned
examples indicate how radically out of step Miller’s view is with the conventional conception
of basic liberties. Of course, it is theoretically possible that convention has got it wrong here;
that, in fact, restrictions upon particular religions, associations, or books are compatible with
respect for basic liberties. For reasons I present elsewhere, I think we should stand by the
conventional view. See Oberman, “Immigration as a Human Right.”
50. Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 27: Freedom of Movement
ðArticle 12Þ, para. 1.
51. Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 15: The Position of Aliens under
the Covenant.
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ciate with her; to do so is harassment, not free association. Similarly, basic
liberties to free expression and movement are bounded by property rights
that prevent people from reading other people’s books or walking on
other people’s land without the owner’s consent. Basic liberties demand
that when people make themselves and their property available to others,
the state does not interfere, but people can refuse to make themselves or
their property available, and those refusals must be respected.52
States, too, can restrict basic liberties, but only when necessary to
prevent grave costs. Thus, for instance, a state might legitimately choose
to ban a political protest if it would result in a serious threat to social or-
der, but it cannot do so to prevent some more minor cost, such as offense
felt by the protester’s opponents or temporary disruption of trafﬁc. The
thought here is that basic liberties are important but nonabsolute, “re-
sistant to trade-offs but not too resistant.”53 This is how they are under-
stood in international human rights documents, such as the UDHR and
the ICCPR, that include a list of reasons that justify curtailment.54
This conception of basic liberties, as extensive but also bounded and
nonabsolute, is a conventional one. Nevertheless, it is a conception that
has radical implications for immigration policy, since the idea of a basic
liberty to cross international borders is one that follows directly from it.
If basic liberties entitle us to an extensive range of choice, then we are
entitled to access jobs, civic associations, religious institutions, friends,
family, romantic partners, opportunities to study, and opportunities for
52. Miller identiﬁes the latter point but misses the former when he claims that private
property falls outside of the ambit of a right to free movement ðMiller, National Responsibility,
206Þ. As long as we have permission to enter an area of private property, such as our home,
school, church, or ofﬁce, our right to free movement entitles us to do so. Were things oth-
erwise, it is doubtful that the right to free movement could even protect our ability to access
an “adequate” range of options, as so many options are situated on private land. It is true that
private property makes the exercise of free movement conditional upon the consent of
property owners, but, as indicated, conditionality of this sort is a feature of most basic liber-
ties, reﬂecting, not the unimportance of options that lie beyond an “adequate” range but the
importance attached to property rights and individual consent. A conditional right is a gen-
uine right, no less real or important for being conditional; this is a point that Miller himself
ably makes elsewhere ðibid., 209Þ.
53. James Grifﬁn, On Human Rights ðOxford: Oxford University Press, 2008Þ, 37. I shall
leave aside the question of what precisely makes a cost grave enough to justify the restriction
of a basic liberty, although at least two factors seem relevant: ðiÞ the extent of the cost that
individuals experience and ðiiÞ the number of individuals that experience the cost. For more
on the issue of when basic liberties and, relatedly, human rights can be justiﬁably restricted,
see Grifﬁn, On Human Rights, 57–82; Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 474–80; and Jeremy Waldron,
“Rights in Conﬂict,” Ethics 99 ð1989Þ: 503–19.
54. See article 29 ð2Þ of the UDHR and articles 12 ð3Þ, 18 ð3Þ, 19 ð3Þ, and 22 ð2Þ of the
ICCPR. The UN Human Rights Committee has provided further guidance on justiﬁed cur-
tailment of free movement and free emigration in its General Comment No. 27.
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expression ðprotests, publicmeetings, conferences, etc.Þ available in other
states. States cannot justify denying us these options on the basis that we
already have a degree of choice in our home state. Such a justiﬁcation
does not work to justify immigration restrictions any more than it works
to justify domestic restrictions against individual religions, associations, or
works of literature. Indeed, as we have seen, the idea that people are
entitled to access options available in other states is already partially rec-
ognized in international law. Once admitted to a state, foreigners are
entitled to move, associate, worship, and so forth, freely within it. Yet, if
basic liberties are so extensive that they entitle people to access options in
other states upon admission, then they are also sufﬁciently extensive to
entitle people to access options in other states before admission. The
recognition of a basic liberty to cross international borders completes the
incomplete recognition that current human rights law gives to the value
of accessing options abroad.
But what about the bounds upon basic liberties set by individual
rights and liberties? Could these not justify immigration restrictions? No.
If some citizens do not wish to associate with foreigners, marry foreign-
ers, listen to what they have to say, or admit them to their property, then
they can do so by refusing to make themselves or their property so avail-
able. What they cannot do is dictate the use of public space or deny to
other citizens the freedom to make these choices for themselves. ðNote
that even in the most xenophobic of states, some citizens wish to associ-
ate with foreigners.Þ Immigration restrictions overreach individual rights
of refusal, turning the preferences of some into the law for all.55 As such,
they violate not only the basic liberties of foreigners but those of citizens
as well.56
The only possible justiﬁcation for immigration restrictions, then,
seems to be one that refers to the threat of some grave cost, whether that
cost would be borne by host state citizens, the citizens of the sending state,
or the migrants themselves. That justiﬁcation is one that is consistent with
the idea of awarding the freedom to migrate the status of a nonabsolute
55. Christopher Wellman has suggested that we regard states as large-scale analogs of
those domestic associations, such as marriages, churches, and clubs, which have the power
to choose their membership. But while there are good reasons, to do with intimacy and
conscience, for some domestic associations to enjoy this power, these reasons do not extend
to states. If there is any kind of domestic association that best resembles states, it is regional
areas such as federal states, provinces, and cantons, and yet crucially these do not have the
power to exclude outsiders. For the argument that freedom of association can ground a
right to exclude, see Wellman, “Immigration and Freedom of Association,” 109–41. For
persuasive arguments against, see Sarah Fine, “Freedom of Association Is Not the Answer,”
Ethics 120 ð2010Þ: 338–56; and Miller, National Responsibility, 210.
56. Steiner, “Hard Borders,” 79–80.
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basic liberty. But if the freedom to migrate is a nonabsolute basic liberty,
what implication does this have for the argument for restricting immi-
gration on brain drain grounds? On the one hand, it does not mean the
argument should be rejected altogether. If people in poor states are left
without the assistance to which they are entitled, their needs are left
unfulﬁlled and their very survival is put at risk. This is precisely the sort
of cost that is grave enough to justify the restriction of a basic liberty.57
When a rich state cannot use its own resources to compensate for the
effects of deleterious brain drain, then the rich state may indeed be jus-
tiﬁed in imposing immigration restrictions. On the other hand, if mi-
gration is a basic liberty, then immigration restrictions cannot be im-
posed to avoid a less than severe cost, and the imposition of distributive
unfairness upon rich states ﬁts this latter category. Once people’s basic
needs have been fulﬁlled, basic liberties should not be restricted for fur-
ther gains in the fair allocation of economic resources.58 This, then, is why
I contend that rich states must seek to provide extra assistance to com-
pensate for the effects of deleterious brain drain before they consider
enforcing immigration restrictions against skilled workers. This is true
even though skilled workers may have a duty to stay in their home state
in order to provide their fair share of assistance.59 A skilled worker may
have a duty to stay, but, since she has a basic liberty to migrate, she also has
a right to violate her duty.60
Note that this position is in fact no different from what many already
believe about the importance of the freedom to migrate when set against
distributive fairness. Consider here the example of British doctors who,
attracted by higher salaries in the United States, emigrate or threaten to
emigrate from the United Kingdom. As a result of their actions, the Brit-
ish National Health Service has to spend money on retaining those who
threaten to leave by paying them higher wages and/or replacing those
that act on this threat. Since doctors are well off in any case, it seems
unfair that they should impose these additional costs by pursuing their
own self-interest, and British doctors may well have a duty to stay in
Britain rather than emigrate or threaten to emigrate to the United States.
Yet, despite the unfairness, it would be wrong for the United Kingdom to
prevent doctors from emigrating to the United States or, for that matter,
57. In other words, global poverty can be thought of as an emergency situation, much
like a breakdown in social order or the spread of an epidemic. On this, see Elizabeth
Ashford, “Utilitarianism, Integrity, and Partiality,” Journal of Philosophy 97 ð2000Þ: 421–39.
58. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 476.
59. My approach here follows Cohen, Rescuing Justice, 182–95.
60. See David Enoch, “A Right to Violate One’s Duty,” Law and Philosophy 21 ð2002Þ:
355–84; and Jeremy Waldron, “A Right to Do Wrong,” Ethics 92 ð1981Þ: 21–39.
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for the United States to prevent the doctors from immigrating.61 Raising
additional tax revenues to address the problem may involve an unfair-
ness, but it remains an acceptable alternative to restricting a British doc-
tor’s freedom to migrate.62
The case of British doctors is relevantly analogous to the case of
skilled workers from poor states. In both cases, the detrimental conse-
quences of granting the freedom to migrate can be avoided if those in a
position to provide extra assistance are willing to do so. The British tax-
payer in the British doctor case and rich states in the case of skilled
workers must pay more. And in both cases, while such a solution rep-
resents an unfairness to those who must provide this extra assistance, it
is nevertheless required, since the two alternative solutions, of curtailing
the workers’ freedom to migrate or denying their compatriots the pro-
vision of some basic good, are unacceptable.
But what about situations where, for whatever reason, rich states have
no acceptable alternative means of ensuring that the migrant skilled
workers’ poor compatriots receive the assistance they are entitled to? In
such cases, we face a simple dilemma between the ﬁrst two options: the
freedom to migrate for skilled workers or assistance for their poor com-
patriots. Given such a dilemma and given the moral evil that poverty
constitutes, the use of immigration restrictions can be justiﬁed on brain
drain grounds. However, it is not necessarily the case that rich states have
the legitimacy to impose these otherwise just immigration restrictions.
That is a point to which I now turn.
V. LEGITIMACY
Rich states owe duties of assistance toward the global poor, which many
believe they are failing to fulﬁll.63 The question then arises whether rich
states have the right to impose counter-brain-drain immigration restric-
tions if they fail to fulﬁll their own duties of assistance to the global poor.
There is no simple answer to this question. A general principle, that
only states which are fully just can legitimately enforce justice, would be
implausibly strong. Since all states, like the individuals who live within
them, are morally imperfect, a rule of this sort would set the bar of legit-
imacy too high. We would be forced to wait, as crimes go undeterred and
taxes go uncollected, for a perfectly just state to emerge. We might be left
waiting forever.
61. Some argue that there is a moral asymmetry between emigration and immigration
that makes restrictions on the latter much easier to justify than on the former. For why this
view is mistaken, see Cole, Philosophies of Exclusion, 43–59.
62. For a closely related discussion, see Cohen, Rescuing Justice, 199–200.
63. This would seem to include former UK Prime Minister Gordon Brown. See “Brown
Admits Failures in Fight against World Poverty,” Guardian, January 11, 2005.
448 Ethics April 2013
This content downloaded from 129.215.19.193 on Tue, 21 Jan 2014 10:34:06 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Yet the extreme contrary view, that there is no connection whatso-
ever between an agent’s right to enforce moral duties and her own moral
performance, also seems mistaken. In domestic cases we do recognize a
connection between the two when we set high standards for police ofﬁ-
cers, judges, and other law enforcers for abiding by the law and other
ofﬁcial rules. There is a social expectation that law enforcers who break
the law should be considered candidates for dismissal, and that expec-
tation extends even to cases in which the law enforcer’s law breaking is
done off-duty and does not affect her work of enforcing the law upon
others. Why should this be so? There are at least two reasons.
First, there is a concern with perception: the thought that justice
should not only be done but be seen to be done. The perception of those
against whom the law is enforced is particularly important. Since volun-
tary compliance is much preferable to coercive enforcement, people
should be encouraged to perceive and accept the moral principles un-
derlying the law. Yet people are unlikely to perceive or accept the moral
principles underlying a law if they also observe law enforcers breaking the
law. When the law is enforced by law breakers, the impression rendered
is that the law is morally void. Second, there is a certain kind of disrespect
shown when a law enforcer forces others to abide by law that she herself
breaks. She effectively establishes a double standard, treating others dif-
ferently from herself. They must obey her, but she can act as she pleases.
A law enforcer who treats others as her equals makes no exceptions in
her own case. She is prepared to stand with others, bearing with them the
burdens that she forces upon them. While she maintains the power to
coerce, she remains an equal under the law.
Both of these considerations I think arise in the brain drain case.
Skilled workers seem unlikely to perceive counter-brain-drain immigra-
tion restrictions as the just enforcement of moral duties they already
hold if the states enforcing the restrictions have failed to fulﬁll their own
moral duties toward the global poor. Likewise, when rich states fail to
fulﬁll their own duties toward the global poor, but nevertheless enforce
the duties of skilled workers, they exhibit toward the skilled workers a
form of disrespect: they are forcing others to act in a way that they are
not prepared to act themselves.64
One difference, however, between the case of domestic law enforce-
ment and the brain drain case is that while there are other candidates to
64. Let me offer a third example of a case in which an agent seems to lose the legiti-
macy to enforce justice because of the agent’s own failures to fulﬁll the requirements of
justice. It seems impermissible for a rich person who has herself failed to fulﬁll her own duty
of assistance to the global poor to steal from other rich people to give their money to the
poor. Whether or not redistributive theft is ever permissible, it is impermissible in this case
precisely because of the rich person’s refusal to abide by the redistributive principles that
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replace law-breaking police and judges, there are, realistically, no other
candidates to enforce immigration restrictions besides existing states. If
counter-brain-drain immigration restrictions are to be enforced, we must
rely on existing states to do the enforcement. While in the domestic case we
are not, ordinarily, forced to choose between permitting the unjust to en-
force justice and going without enforcement altogether, in the brain drain
case we are. Surely when this is our choice, when the existing states are, so to
speak, the only sheriffs in town, they retain the legitimacy to enforce
counter-brain-drain immigration restrictions no matter how poorly they
fulﬁll their own moral duties?
There is certainly something to this argument. Perhaps in most or-
dinary cases rich states will retain the right to enforce restrictions despite
their own failures. But there seems to me to be at least some cases in
which this is not true. There are at least some cases in which the failure of
a rich state to fulﬁll its own duties robs it of the legitimacy to enforce
restrictions, even though this means that no restrictions will be enforced.
Consider, ﬁrst, a case in which skilled workers only have a secondary duty
to stay and assist their poor compatriots because a rich state has failed in
its own primary duties toward people in that country. Suppose, for in-
stance, that, ten years ago, a poor country suffered high rates of a disease
such as TB or HIV. Addressing the disease required ðaÞ dedicated work
on the part of health professionals and ðbÞ resources from rich states
ðmedicines, equipment, money for awareness raising, etc.Þ. Suppose, fur-
ther, that, in the intervening period, health professionals did engage in
dedicated work but rich states failed to provide the required resources.
Now, ten years on, the disease remains prevalent. In such a case I do not
think a rich state can exclude the health professionals in order to get
them to address the high disease burden that the rich state itself is re-
sponsible for. The health professionals may have a duty to stay and assist
their poor compatriots struggle to keep the disease at bay, but this is not
a duty that the rich state has the legitimacy to enforce.65
A second case is one in which a rich state has failed to fulﬁll its duty
of assistance to the skilled workers it wishes to exclude. Recall that many
65. I am assuming here a view of collective responsibility that allows for states, or at least
democratic states, to be regarded as agents. Of course states are made up of large numbers
of individuals, who disagree about politics and take different political actions. Nevertheless,
when political leaders, acting within the roles properly assigned to them, make decisions,
one can regard their actions as actions taken by the state. So we may speak, say, of Canada
deciding to give so many dollars in aid each year, although, of course, not all Canadians
made any such decision. This explains why those in charge of immigration policy cannot
sidestep questions of legitimacy by claiming that they share no personal responsibility for
other areas of government policy. What policy makers have the legitimacy to do is restricted
she seeks to force upon others. An example of this sort can be found in Judith Jarvis
Thomson, “Turning the Trolley,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 36 ð2008Þ: 359–74, at 365.
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skilled workers living in poor states are poor themselves. Even when these
skilled workers are not so poor as to make a duty to stay overly demand-
ing, they may nevertheless be owed assistance by a rich state. If a rich state
fails to provide this assistance, I do not think it can legitimately exclude
the skilled workers it has failed to assist. That exclusion would prevent
the workers from accessing the jobs and opportunities in the rich state
that would allow them to achieve the better life that was owed to them all
along. When a skilled worker has experienced hardship and deprivation
in the service of her poor compatriots, it is not for a rich state who has
failed her to enforce any remaining duty she may owe. Skilled workers
may have a duty to endure the injustice of having to live in poverty for the
sake of their poor compatriots, but that duty should not be enforced by
the states that are responsible for this very injustice.66
What is special about these cases? In both cases the two consider-
ations described above ðregarding perception and disrespectÞ arise.
Indeed, they seem especially acute. Were a rich state to exclude skilled
workers in these cases, the perception created is a particularly poor one
because the hypocrisy involved is particularly strong. Similarly, exclusion
seems particularly disrespectful given the prior injustices perpetrated by
the rich state and the problems these have caused skilled workers and
their poor compatriots. There are, most likely, other considerations that
arise in these cases, but the task of identifying them is one I shall set aside
here.
Both cases involve prior injustice, and this fact may point to a pos-
sible remedy: the rich state involved may be able to engage in some sort of
reparative act, such as issuing an apology or offering compensation or at
least making a belated commitment to fulﬁll its duties. Havingmade some
sort of amends for its own failures, a rich state may regain the legitimacy to
enforce the duties of skilled workers. Nevertheless, in the absence of re-
parative steps, rich states do not have the legitimacy to enforce counter-
brain-drain immigration restrictions in these two cases.
It might still be objected that even in the cases I have highlighted the
overall consequences are better if rich states enforce counter-brain-drain
immigration restrictions than if they do not. It is true that those who judge
the permissibility of an act solely by its consequences will be unable to
accept this latest set of conditions. But why should we think that the con-
66. The view that rich states cannot exclude poor foreigners they have failed to assist is
in fact a widely held view among the philosophers engaged in the immigration debate; it is a
point highlighted in Kieran Oberman, “Immigration, Global Poverty and the Right to Stay,”
Political Studies 59 ð2011Þ: 253–68.
to what the state has the legitimacy to do. If the state fails to fulﬁll certain duties and thereby
loses the legitimacy to perform certain actions, policy makers cannot direct the state to per-
form these actions, even though the policy makers themselves may bear no personal re-
sponsibility for the state’s failures.
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sequences alone are what matter? It has long been argued that other
factors are relevant. For instance, many hold that the agent’s intentions
can, in certain contexts, render an otherwise permissible act impermissi-
ble; they accept, that is, the doctrine of double effect or some similar
doctrine. The view expressed here, that an agent’s own unjust conduct
can, in certain contexts, render it impermissible for the agent to enforce
justice, is not so different. Indeed this view has itself attracted support.
Jesus endorsed it when he said to those wishing to punish an adulterer,
“He that is without sin among you, let him ﬁrst cast a stone at her.”67 The
view has also found currency in popular political discourse: those opposing
the US-led wars of recent years have often slammed human rights or anti-
terror justiﬁcations for these wars by referring to the United States’ own
poor record in these areas.68
Interestingly, despite biblical and popular endorsement, the idea
that an agent’s own unjust conduct can render it impermissible for the
agent to enforce justice has received little attention within academic
philosophy.69 Why is not clear. Perhaps philosophers have simply found it
implausible, indeed, not even worth refuting. Stronger elaborations of
the idea are indeed implausible.70 But, as I hope to have shown, there are
weaker elaborations that are plausible and as such demand consider-
ation.
VI. CONCLUSION
To conclude, let me lay out the full list of conditions and subconditions
for justiﬁed exclusion on brain drain grounds.
A rich state can justify imposing immigration restrictions against a
skilled worker on brain drain grounds only if:
67. John 8:7.
68. See Noam Chomsky, “Imperial Presidency,” ZMagazine, December 17, 2004, http://
www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/7223; and Edward Said, “AMonumental Hypocrisy: WeMust
Raise Our Voices, March in Protest, Now and Again and Again,” Counterpunch, February 15,
2003, http://www.counterpunch.org/said02152003.html.
69. An exception is Daryl Glaser, “Does Hypocrisy Matter? The Case of US Foreign
Policy,” Review of International Studies 32 ð2006Þ: 251–68. The wider question of what ðif any-
thingÞ should be done to address hypocrisy in politics is discussed in David Runciman,
Political Hypocrisy: The Mask of Power, fromHobbes to Orwell and Beyond ðPrinceton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 2008Þ; and JudithN. Shklar,Ordinary Vices ðCambridge,MA: Belknap, 1984Þ,
chap. 2. A closely related argument to the one I have presented can be found in G. A. Cohen,
“Casting the First Stone: Who Can, and Who Can’t, Condemn the Terrorists?” Royal Institute
of Philosophy Supplements 81 ð2006Þ: 113–36.
70. Some of the antiwar arguments that refer to hypocrisy seem implausibly strong. See
Glaser, “Does Hypocrisy Matter?”
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Condition 1. The skilled worker owes assistance to her poor com-
patriots.
She will owe them assistance if:
i. She relied on state funds to pay for her training and has not
fulﬁlled her obligation of repayment and/or
ii. She has not fulﬁlled her duty of assistance.
Condition 2. The skilled worker has a duty to stay in her state of
origin to provide the assistance she owes her poor
compatriots.
She will have this duty to stay if and only if:
i. She can better provide the assistance she owes if she stays in
her state of origin than from her state of destination.
ii. She will not face an unreasonably high cost in staying.
Condition 3. It is permissible to enforce a skilled worker’s duty to
stay and assist her poor compatriots using immigra-
tion restrictions.
This is so if and only if:
i. There is no acceptable alternative means of ensuring that
the poor compatriots receive the assistance they are owed.
Condition 4. The rich state has the legitimacy to impose counter-
brain-drain immigration restrictions.
The rich state has this legitimacy if:
i. It has fulﬁlled its own duty of assistance to the global poor.
Or at least:
ii. The rich state is not seeking to enforce a skilled worker’s
secondary duty of assistance that the skilled worker only has
because the rich state has failed to fulﬁll its primary duty of
assistance.
iii. The rich state is committed to fulﬁlling its duty of assistance
toward the skilled worker.
How often will these conditions be fulﬁlled? In the case of almost all
skilled workers, condition 1 will be fulﬁlled. However, the other condi-
tions are far less likely to be fulﬁlled since many skilled workers have
strong reason to leave, and there are many things rich states could be
doing to address global poverty in general and brain drain in particular
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which they are failing to do. In most cases, it seems, the brain drain ar-
gument for immigration restrictions will not succeed.
There may, however, be some real world cases in which the brain
drain argument does succeed. For not all skilled workers are desperately
poor; some enjoy a privileged social position and live in relative comfort.
Nor is it the case that rich states are able to take effective action against
poverty and brain drain in every poor state: some poor states are simply
too corrupt and ill-governed for outside assistance to prove effective. Cases
in which immigration restrictions can be justiﬁed on brain drain grounds
are thus likely to be those in which these two factors are conjoined: they
will be cases involving skilled workers who are relatively well off yet live in
states which suffer from problems that block effective assistance from
outside.
How, in practical terms, could a rich state identify those cases in
which it can justiﬁably impose immigration restrictions on brain drain
grounds? Let me suggest a three-stage process by which this might be
done. First, the rich state would draw up a list of poor states, and sectors
within those states, that suffer from deleterious brain drain. So, for in-
stance, it might select the Zambian health sector, described in the intro-
duction of this article, as a sector suffering from deleterious brain drain.
Second, from the list it would select those cases in which alternative means
of addressing the problem—taxing emigrants in the receiving state, rais-
ing salaries in the sending state, recruiting replacement workers to work
in the sending state, and so forth—are unlikely to prove effective. The
rich state would be able to select a case with conﬁdence if it had already
made determined efforts to address the problem there by alternative
means. Third, it would continue to offer all skilled workers the opportunity
to apply for family reuniﬁcation and asylum. It would also expand the cri-
teria for eligibility for asylum to include not only those with a well-founded
fear of persecution ð“refugees” under the current legal deﬁnitionÞ but also
those escaping desperate poverty, generalized violence, and dangerous
working conditions.71 This third stage is important in order to allow skilled
workers who face unreasonably high costs if they stay in their home state a
means to avoid being subject to immigration restrictions. Having under-
gone this three-stage process, the rich state would be left with a group of
skilled workers, from the selected states, who have either failed to apply for
family reuniﬁcation and asylum or who have had their applications re-
jected. It is this group of skilled workers that the rich state would consider
excluding.
This three-stage process would help to ensure that the ﬁrst three
conditions for justiﬁed exclusion on brain drain grounds are satisﬁed.
71. For the case for an expansion of this sort, see Andrew E. Shacknove, “Who Is a
Refugee?” Ethics 95 ð1985Þ: 274–84.
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Condition 4 is much harder to assess as it would require that a rich state
undergo some form of self-assessment to see whether it has sufﬁcient le-
gitimacy to enforce restrictions. Whether any meaningful self-assessment
of this sort can be done is questionable.
There are, then, likely to be cases in which immigration restrictions
can be justiﬁed on brain drain grounds, and there are practical steps
which rich states can take to help identify these cases. All the same, it may
still seem surprising to some that brain drain cannot justify immigration
restrictions outside this narrow range of cases. Brain drain can cause
grave suffering, and it may seem odd that states cannot impose immi-
gration restrictions to prevent grave suffering when they routinely impose
such restrictions for a variety of lesser purposes. Yet, from the fact that
immigration restrictions are routinely imposed, no one should deduce
that they are easy to justify. Immigration restrictions restrict people’s basic
liberties to move, work, and associate as they wish and, in some cases,
force individuals to remain in places that they have compelling reason to
leave. Imposing immigration restrictions on brain drain grounds, more-
over, involves coercing people in an effort to get them to labor for the sake
of others. Counter-brain-drain immigration restrictions thus require a
form of justiﬁcation that, far from treating skilled workers as tools for
development, takes seriously their rights, interests, and liberties. This is
what this article has sought to provide.
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